International Lawyer
Volume 3

Number 2

Article 8

1969

Arbitration under the Auspices of the World Bank
Paul Szasz

Recommended Citation
Paul Szasz, Arbitration under the Auspices of the World Bank, 3 INT'L L. 312 (1969)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol3/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

PAUL SZASZ*

Arbitration

Under the Auspices of the World Bank
I am afraid that I must start in clarification, or rather correction,
of the title of these remarks. It should be noted that the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to use its formal title, has
not sought to extend its role as one of the principal international
financial institutions to become also a tribunal for the settlement of
disputes. It is true that the Bank has occasionally' lent its good offices
to parties seeking to settle long-festering financial disagreements,
particularly if these tended to burden the credit rating or the economies
of one of the parties, to the deterioration of its standing as an actual or
potential borrower from the Bank. Thus, the President of the Bank has
acted as conciliator with regard to three matters: Pre-World War II
bonds issued by the City of Tokyo, the expropriation of the Suez Canal
and the expropriation of a number of French or French-owned
companies in Tunisia. At no time has the Bank or its President acted as
arbitrator.
Settling disputes is not and should not be an important part of the
business of any bank. Nevertheless, many more requests for the
performance of such services were addressed to the World Bank and
though it was reluctant to comply it appeared that there was a need for
some institution that could fill a significant gap in the array of existing
tribunals: one that would be especially designed to accommodate, on a
basis of parity, both governmental parties and private investors. Such an
institution could, through its very existence, improve the investment
climate (and thus reduce the demands on the Bank's limited resources)
of those developing States using its services in order to attract investors
otherwise fearful of entering a foreign jurisdiction without having
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access to an impartial, assured forum to settle any disputes that might
arise with the host Government.
Considerations of this type led the Bank to formulate the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States of March 18, 1965 (the SID Convention),
whereby the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes was established. The Centre is an independent, international
entity-though, to be sure, it is closely tied, administratively even more
than legally, to the Bank. At present the Centre is located at the
headquarters of the Bank in Washington, and is financed by and staffed
through that organization; however, the most important fixed tie
between the institutions is through the President of the Bank, who ex
officio serves as the non-voting Chairman of the Administrative Council
of the Centre. Thus, while the Convention is popularly referred to as
the World Bank Convention, any disputes that are submitted to the
Centre for conciliation or arbitration will be resolved by Conciliation
Commissions or Arbitral Tribunals established ad hoc under its
auspices, and not under that of the Bank.
The Convention entered into force on October 14, 1966. At
present, fifty-seven States have signed that instrument and forty-one of
these have ratified it-thus becoming Contracting States. Among the
earliest to do so was the United States of America, which thus for the
first time became a party to an international agreement concerning the
arbitration of private disputes.
The following observations will concern so much the structure of
the Centre (which is of interest principally to scholars of international
organizations), but rather its jurisdiction, and the principal and special
procedural features of the Convention.
Jurisdiction of the Centre
Within the ambit of the jurisdiction it defines, the SID Convention
is a potent instrument. However, just for that reason, its jurisdiction is
circumscribed both narrowly and rigidly, in terms of three orthogonal
factors: the nature of the parties; the nature of the dispute; and the
requirement of prior consent.
The Parties

The requirements as to the nature of the parties are one of the
special features of the Convention-indeed they are reflected in its title.
One of the parties to any dispute presented to the Centre must be a
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Contracting State, or a constituent subdivision or governmental agency
of such a State, properly designated for this purpose by the latter. The
other party must be a private person, who is a national of another
Contracting State; though a natural person with dual citizenship,
including that of the State party to the dispute, is barred from resorting
to the Centre, a juridical person who is nominally the national of that
State (for example, through incorporation within it) may oppose its
own Government before the Centre if it is controlled by the nationals
of another Contracting State.
Thus, the Centre is not available for litigation between Stateswho can resort to the International Court of Justice or to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Nor is it available for litigation
between private parties, who can resort to a neutral national court or to
arbitration under the auspices of the International Chamber of
Commerce or the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission.
Nor, finally, is it available for litigation between a citizen and his own
Government, which normally must be accomplished in domestic courts
or administrative tribunals.
The Dispute
The second jurisdictional requirement is that disputes submitted
to the Centre must be "legal" ones arising directly out of an
"investment." As neither of these terms is defined in the Convention, a
good deal of latitude is left to the parties to the dispute. Nevertheless, it
is clear that more conflicts of interest are barred, if not based on any
legal claim, and so are disputes about transactions or situations that
cannot be characterized as investments.
Consent
The final, and in a sense the most important requirement is that of
consent, which must be given: by both parties, in writing (though not
necessarily in the same instrument,) and must in every case precede the
submission of the dispute to the Centre. Thus the latter is not
authorized, if a dispute is referred to it by one party, to approach the
other to obtain its consent; if consent is lacking, the Centre remains
inactive and the case is not even registered. Furthermore, if the
existence of consent should be in question and is referred to the
Arbitral Tribunal appointed for the dispute, the party contesting the
jurisdiction on this or any other grounds can appear to litigate this
point without fear of thereby waiving any prior lack of consent.
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The Regime of the Convention
Having thus outlined the jurisdiction defined by the Convention, I
would like to move to its special features. All legislation about
arbitration, whether domestic or international, and whether expressed
in the form of a law, a treaty, or an agreed or merely recommended set
of regulations or rules, deals with one or more of three subjects:
(i) The binding nature and the effect of an agreement to arbitrate;
(ii) The arbitral procedure;
(iii) The enforcement of arbitral awards.
Thus, for example the U.S. Code Title on "Arbitration" deals,
rather briefly, with each of these subjects. The 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, however, deals only
with questions of enforcement, while the 1958 New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
concerns both the effect of agreements to arbitrate and the enforcement of awards. The 1961 European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration deals with the effect of arbitral agreements and
with arbitral rules, but barely touches on enforcement; in contrast, the
draft Inter-American Convention on Commercial Arbitration would
cover primarily arbitral rules (largely by incorporating those of the
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission) as well as the
enforcement of awards. Finally, the Arbitration Rules of the Economic
Commission for Europe and those of the Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East deal, as their titles suggest, only with the
procedure of arbitration-and this also is the sole subject of the several
sets of rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, the InterAmerican Commercial Arbitration Commission and the American
Arbitration Association.
The SID Convention is one instrument that deals with all three of
the listed subjects, and it does so in part in considerable detail and in
rather special ways.
The Obligationto Arbitrate

Concerning the effect of agreements for the conciliation or
arbitration of disputes under the auspices of the Centre, two features of
the regime established by the SID Convention should be noted. The
first is that once both parties have agreed to resort to the Centre with
respect to either an actual or a prospective dispute, then neither of
them may withdraw their consent unilaterally. Even if one or both of
the Contracting States concerned (the host State, or that of the
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investor) should denounce the Convention, consents given prior to such
denunciation remain valid and binding; and even if the Convention
itself should be amended by the unanimous agreement of its parties,
this would not affect pre-existing consents. Thus, even an investor's
own State cannot deprive him of his rights under the Conventionwhich thus joins the lengthening list of international instruments that
assign direct rights to individuals.
The second feature to note is that the enforcement of the
obligation to arbitrate is, in effect, almost entirely internal to the
regime created by the Convention. In this it differs from legislation
such as the federal Arbitration Title, which directs the federal courts to
compel parties to arbitrate if they have agreed to do so, enjoins the
courts from deciding issues that should be submitted to arbitration
under an existing agreement, and for these purposes empowers the
courts to adjudicate the validity of arbitral agreements. Under the SID
Convention there is no outside authority to resort to, either to compel
a party to arbitrate or to prevent it from otherwise litigating an
arbitrable issue-though a national or international court to which such
an issue is submitted might decline to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that such submission violates the provision of the Convention
specifying that an agreement to arbitrate under the Convention
ordinarily excludes all other remedies. Only the Arbitral Tribunal
established for the dispute can decide all questions involving its own
competence-including the validity of the arbitral agreement pursuant
to which it was established. Thus the SID Convention accomplishes the
"separation" of the arbitral clause from any agreement in which it may
be incorporated: even the assertion that the entire agreement is invalid
cannot deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction to decide, finally, this very
issue-for its authority, in this respect, derives primarily from the
Convention and only secondarily from the asserted consent of the
parties. In this sense an agreement to submit a dispute to the Centre is
superior to other international arbitration clauses, which, even if they
refer to an existing institution (such as the International Chamber of
Commerce), cannot avoid the possibility that a challenge to the validity
of the clause itself must first be litigated in some forum having
jurisdiction with respect to both parties-which may be difficult to find
if one of them is a Government-and risk frustration if no such forum
can be found. Should either party refuse to acknowledge this authority
of a Tribunal established pursuant to the SID Convention, that forum
of course cannot force that party to litigate before it either jurisdiction
or substance, but even in the event of a default it can enter an award
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against either party which is, as will be pointed out below, final,
binding, and enforceable without relitigation in all Contracting States.

ArbitralProcedure
The procedural regime established by the Convention with respect
to conciliation or arbitration is characterized throughout by the
interaction of two complementary principles:
(a) To the extent that the parties agree as to any procedural point, that
agreement will generally govern. Thus the procedure can be shaped
to meet the particular requirements of the parties-a point of
considerable importance to Governments, which are traditionally
reluctant to submit themselves to rigid court-like rules (even if the
submission to the proceeding is basically optional, such as with
respect to the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the International
Chamber of Commerce).
(b) To the extent that the parties fail to agree on any point, the
Convention always provides a fall-back formula or procedure which
can be applied automatically. Thus, once both parties have agreed
to resort to the Centre, there is no possibility of this consent being
frustrated by the inability of both parties, or the unwillingness of
one of them, to agree on any or all procedural details.
The impact of these two principles can be illustrated with
reference to a number of separate issues:
(1) The parties can agree to almost any formula for the composition of
their Tribunal (though it must have an odd number of members,
who are subject to certain restrictions as to their nationality)-but
if they cannot agree, a three-member Tribunal will be established.
(2) The parties may appoint (individually, jointly or through some
impartial outside authority) almost any one to their Tribunal-but
if the appointment procedure they agree on should break down for
any reason, in whole or in part, then the Chairman of the
Administrative Council of the Centre is empowered to make any
appointments necessary to complete the Tribunal.
(3) The parties may agree on any formula for dividing the expenses of
the proceeding-but if they do not agree, the Tribunal must
accomplish this apportionment in its award.
(4) Any procedure or rules, not in conflict with the few explicitly
stated in the Convention or appearing in the Regulation of the
Centre, may be adopted by the parties-but if they fail to agree,
then the Rules or Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings adopted
by the Administrative Council automatically apply, and to the
extent that these leave any hiatus the Tribunal is empowered to fill
lacuna through its own rulings.
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(5) The parties may agree to any legal system (national, international
or ad hoc) for the resolution of their dispute, and they may also
empower their Tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono-but if no
agreement is reached, then the law of the Contracting State party
to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such
rules of international law as may be applicable are automatically
applied.
(6) The parties may agree that the proceeding be conducted anywhere
the Centre can make adequate arrangements-but if they cannot
agree on any such place, then the proceeding is automatically held
at the seat of the Centre.
(7) The parties may authorize or forbid their Tribunal to decide
additional related claims or counter-claims and to deal with
requests for provisional measures-but if they reach no agreement
as to these points, then the Tribunal is automatically empowered to
settle ancillary questions and to recommend, but not to impose,
provisional measures.
(8) If the parties agree to publish the award rendered by their Tribunal,
or the minutes of its proceedings, this will be done-but if either
party fails to agree then there may be no publication.

Enforcement of Awards
We come now finally to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards rendered pursuant to the SID Convention. That
instrument provides that these awards shall be:
(a) binding;
(b) not subject to any appeal or remedy except as provided in the
Convention (which allows the supplementing, correcting, revising,
interpreting or annulling of awards, through the original Tribunal, a
new Tribunal, or a special ad hoc Committee established to review
charges of corruption or other fundamental defects);
(c) abided by and complied with by each party;
(d) recognized by each Contracting State; and
(e) most importantly, enforceable as to their pecuniary obligations in
each Contracting State, as if they were final judgments of a court in
that State.
It should be noted that such recognition or enforcement must be
afforded by every Contracting State, whether or not it or one of its
nationals is a party to the dispute. To facilitate the implementation of

this provision, each State is obliged to designate to the Centre the
domestic court or other authority responsible for such enforcement;
the United States has, by law, designated the Federal District Courts for
this purpose. The procedure of such enforcement is not specified in the
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Convention, but is to follow the laws concerning the execution of
judgments of the country in which enforcement is sought. To the
exteit that that law protects certain property touched with sovereign
or diplomatic immunity from any execution, such immunity is not
affected by the Convention.
The most important feature as to the enforcement of arbitral
awards through domestic tribunals is that these may not re-examine any
issue decided by the Tribunal. While, for instance, the 1958 New York
Convention lists over half-a-dozen grounds on which enforcement of an
arbitral award may be refused, and the 1961 European Convention
contains a somewhat shorter but still substantial list-and thus both
these instruments require the court in which enforcement is sought to
examine at least the jurisdiction of the original arbitral tribunal and in
part the substance of the award-the SID Convention permits no such
exceptions and allows no such examinations. In the words of the
American Act to implement the Convention: "the pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the
same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a
court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States."
Conclusion
I hope I have succeeded in demonstrating that the SID Convention
is a specialized instrument, designed to perform a particular task and to
perform it effectively. That task is to provide an absolutely assured
forum to which Governments and foreign investors can agree to resort
either in advance of any legal dispute between them or once one has
arisen. There already is evidence that the establishment of this new
facility has been welcomed by the investment community and that the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes through its
very existence is helping to ease the international flow of private capital
to developing countries.
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